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Executive summary
Using new evidence on the digitalisation activities of firms in the European Union and the 
United States, we document a trend towards digital polarisation based on firms’ use of the 
latest digital technologies and their plans for future investment in digitalisation. A substantial 
share of firms are not implementing any state-of-the-art digital technologies and do not 
have plans to invest in digitalisation. However, there is also a substantial share of firms that 
are already partially or even fully implementing state-of-the-art digital technologies in their 
businesses and that plan to further increase their digitalisation investments.
Small Manufacturing firms and old small firms in services are significantly more 
likely to be and remain non-active in terms of digitalisation. Our results do not provide 
any evidence that EU firms are more likely than their US counterparts to be stuck on the 
wrong side of the digitalisation divide. Taking into account firm size and firm age, there 
are no significant differences between the EU and the US in terms of having more or fewer 
persistently non-digital firms. 
As persistently digitally-inactive firms are also less likely to be innovative, to add 
employees or to command higher mark-ups, it is important for policymaking to remove 
barriers that trap these firms in persistent digital inactivity. Lack of access to finance is a 
major barrier for EU firms compared to their US counterparts, particularly for the EU’s 
persistently non-digital firms, and especially for older, smaller companies in services. 
Improving their access to finance might therefore go a long way towards addressing the 
corporate digitalisation divide in the EU.
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1 Introduction
Digital technologies have proliferated in the business sector, from the provision of digital 
products and services online to robotised production processes, the internet of things, big 
data and artificial intelligence, and applications, including use of digital systems to manage 
back office tasks. Numerous optimistic statements have been made that the digitalisation of 
the business sector will boost growth and productivity and trigger a fourth industrial revolu-
tion. However, there has been so far little hard evidence of a significant productivity boost. 
More than 30 years after Robert Solow’s (1987) statement “you can see the computer age 
everywhere but in productivity statistics”, macro-level productivity growth remains subdued. 
Meanwhile, digitalisation is feared as a source of disruption, with the risk that only a few firms 
will emerge as winners while many firms and workers lose out, leading to a more polarised 
economic structure. 
There is some evidence that this polarisation is happening and digital technologies are 
leading to winner-takes-all markets. Andrews et al (2017) showed an increasing productivity 
gap between firms at the global frontier and laggards. Frontier firms are typically larger, more 
innovative and have higher rates of digital technology adoption1. There is also evidence of 
rising market concentration (Autor et al, 2017; Philippon, 2019) and rising mark-ups by firms 
(De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). In particular, Diez et al (2018) found that mark-ups have 
risen among firms that already have the highest mark-ups within their industries, consistent 
with winner-takes-all patterns. The trends of rising market concentration and mark-ups tend 
be more pronounced in the sectors in which digital technologies, especially digital services, 
are developed or widely adopted (Calligaris et al, 2018). Digital technologies often come with 
features such as scale and synergies, which give an advantage to large firms and foster market 
concentration (Haskel and Westlake, 2017). 
The discussion on winner-take-all markets and rising mark-ups by firms that already have 
the highest mark-ups is perhaps most associated with Big Tech firms, such as Alibaba, Alpha-
bet, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Huawei and Microsoft. All these companies are from the US or 
China. European firms are not present among the Big Tech giants and European Union firms 
are not among the leading digital research and development investors (Veugelers, 2018; EIB, 
2018). 
The EU has fallen behind in the digital technologies and services race but might be able to 
take up leading positions in new races. This will depend on the integration of digital technol-
ogies, including the internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI), into manufacturing 
and services (eg Bughin et al, 2019). For example, car manufacturing, a pivotal sector for the 
EU economy, is now done in the context of a whole series of digital services (smart electricity 
grids, personalised entertainment systems, smart mobility), which are all part of a network 
centred on the physical platform represented by the car and based on IoT and AI. 
If European firms are unable to integrate new digital technologies into their business 
models, they will lose out, even in those sectors where they are currently still leading. There 
is growing concern that EU firms in non-digital sectors lag behind in the adoption of digital 
technologies, especially in the services sector (EIB, 2018). This correlates with subdued EU 
productivity growth. 
Although these are first-order concerns, there is little large-scale cross-sector and cross-
national firm-level evidence about digital technology use, which would allow the position 
of EU firms on the digital technology divide compared with their US peers to be checked. 
Using the results of a large-scale survey on the digitalisation activities of EU and US firms, 
conducted in 2018 by the European Investment Bank, this Policy Contribution addresses 
1 Andrews et al (2016) define global frontier firms as the top 5 percent of firms in terms of labour productivity levels, 
within each two-digit sector, in each year, across all countries since the early 2000s. All other firms are defined as 
laggards.
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this evidence gap. Based on data on the current use by firms of state-of-the-art digital 
technologies in manufacturing and services, and on their future plans for investment in 
digitalisation it maps the corporate digital investment divide and identifies which firms are 
located on which side. 
2 Digital investment and skills survey data
In 2018, the European Investment Bank interviewed 1,700 companies in the EU and the US 
about their digital investments2. To categorise companies according to their stage of digitali-
sation, we used information from these interviews on: 
1. How far companies have gone in adopting the most prominent state-of-the-art digital 
technologies; 
2. Companies’ investment plans for digital technologies. 
The EIB data covers firms with at least five employees in the manufacturing and services 
sectors. The sample was stratified by industry group (manufacturing and services sector), size 
class and region (Table 1)3. 
Table 1: Breakdown of firms surveyed for their digital investment plans 
  Manufacturing Services
European Union 456 432
  West and North Europe 198 198
  South Europe 122 89
  Central and East Europe 146 145
United States 411 389
  Northeast 93 83
  Midwest 126 136
  South 106 82
  West 86 88
Size (no. employees)
  Micro (5-9) 143 172
  Small (10-49) 291 333
  Medium (50-249) 287 223
  Large (250+) 146 93
Source: EIB (for details see chapter 8 of EIB, 2018). Note: West and North Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. South Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Central 
and East Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. US 
regions according to US Census Bureau geographical divisions.
2 For details, see chapter 8 of EIB (2018).
3 The sample size of the 2018 EIB survey is relatively small. The survey is representative at the level of the three 
aggregate groups of countries in the EU and the four regions in the US (Table 1) but not at individual EU country 
level. Similarly, it is representative for the manufacturing and services sectors, but does not provide more detailed 
information on industry classification within those broad sectors. The full database underlying the results reported 
in this Policy Contribution is not publically available. For details, see chapter 8 of EIB (2018).
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2.1 Adoption of digital technologies
We first evaluated the current digitalisation status of companies (divided into manufacturing 
and services companies) according to how far they have gone in adopting the state-of-the-art 
digital technologies listed in Table 24. 
Table 2: State-of-the-art digital technologies covered by the assessment 
Manufacturing
3D printing, also known as additive manufacturing;
Automation via advanced robotics – a second generation of robots, which are more 
autonomous, flexible and often more easily programmable;
Internet of things: electronic devices that communicate with each other without human 
assistance;
Big data and analytics.
Services
Digitalisation and automation of internal routines, including back-office, purchasing and 
logistics management, for example, software that automates routine tasks such as billing 
and accounting;
Web-based applications for marketing and sales, for example, using a specific app 
through which customers can order goods or services;
Provision of digital products and services over the internet, for example offering of 
automated market intelligence or digital content streaming;
Big data and analytics.
Source: EIB (for details see chapter 8 of EIB, 2018).
We labelled as ‘fully digital’ companies that said their entire business is organised around at 
least one of the four digital technologies listed in Table 2. If at least one of the technologies is 
implemented in parts of a firm’s business, we labelled them as ‘partially digital’. We labelled as 
‘non-digital’ all companies that have not heard about any of these digital technologies or have 
only heard about them but have not implemented any of them. Firms in the services sector 
tend to be more digitalised and are more likely to be ‘fully digital’, which could be related to 
the different set of state-of-the-art digital technologies used in the survey to characterise the 
level of digitalisation. 
A first finding is that EU firms are not lagging behind their US counterparts. Figure 1 shows 
no evidence that EU manufacturing firms are less digitally active compared to their US coun-
terparts. For the services sectors, the share of EU firms that are non-digital is larger than in the 
US. However, the share of EU firms that have organised their entire business around digital 
technologies is larger than in the US. But these differences disappear when comparing EU 
and US firms within the same firm size and age category5. 
4 The relevant question from the EIB survey was: ‘Q32. Can you tell me for each of the following technologies if you 
have (i) not heard about them, (ii) have heard about them but not implemented, (iii) implemented them in parts 
of your business, or (iv) whether your entire business is organised around them?’ For details see chapter 8 of EIB 
(2018).
5 For a more detailed discussion, see Rückert et al (2019). 
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Figure 1: Share of firms that are digitally active (in %), 2018
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
2.2 Digital investment plans
In terms of companies’ digital investment plans for the next three years6, we classified compa-
nies as ‘increasing’ if they plan to increase their investments in digital technologies, or if they 
have not yet made digital investments but plan to start doing so. We label all other firms as 
‘stable/inactive/reduced’. 
Around 60 percent of companies plan to increase their digital technology investment 
spending (Figure 2). Although EU firms score somewhat lower than their US counterparts, 
both in manufacturing and services, there a re no major statistically significant differences 
between companies in the EU and US when it comes to future investment in digital 
technologies. 
Figure 2: Share of firms that plan to increase investment in digital technologies in 
the next three years (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
6 The relevant EIB survey question for firms that have already implemented one of the digital technologies read: 
‘Over the next three years, do you expect your investment spend in digital technologies to (i) increase, (ii) stay 
around the same, (iii) decrease, (iv) no investment planned in digital technologies?’ The similar question for 
non-digital firms reads: ‘Looking ahead to the next three years, do you plan to invest in digital technologies?’ 
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3 Who is on which side of the digital divide?
Combining firms’ current state of digital investments with their plans for digital investments 
allows us to characterise firms according to their positions on the digital divide. Figure 3 
shows how digitally active firms are significantly more likely to have plans to expand their dig-
ital investments further. On the other side, firms that are currently not using state-of-the-art 
digital technologies are less likely to have future digital investment plans. This is the case in 
both the EU and the US, in the manufacturing and services sectors. This evidence of polarisa-
tion confirms the existence of a corporate digitalisation divide7. 
Figure 3: Share of firms that plan to increase investment in digital technologies in 
the next three years, by digitalisation intensity (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
The next question is which firms are on which side of the digitalisation divide? Figure 4 
categorises firms according to their current level of digitalisation and their digital investment 
outlook. 
Firms that have not invested so far in state-of-the-art digital technologies and that are 
not planning to do so in the coming years can be considered as falling behind. We categorise 
them as ‘persistently non-digital’. Companies that are currently non-digital but are planning 
to start investing in the coming three years are categorised as ‘beginners’. 
Of the firms that are currently digitally active, those that are planning to increase their 
digital investments in the coming three years are listed as ‘moving ahead’. ‘Stable’ companies 
are already digitalised but do not intend to increase their digital investment spending in the 
coming three years. We further split up the moving-ahead firms depending on whether they 
are currently fully or partially digitally active. ‘Frontrunners’ are those firms that are currently 
already fully digitally active and that are also increasing their digital investments; the rest we 
label as ‘catching-up’. 
7 For multivariate analysis results on the likelihood of firms having plans to expand their digital investments de-
pending on their state of current digitally activity, see Rückert et al (2019). 
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Figure 4: Corporate digitalisation divide categories
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data.
Figure 5 sorts the surveyed companies in the EU and the US in manufacturing and ser-
vices into the digitalisation divide categories of Figure 4. For manufacturing firms, there are 
no major differences in terms of digitalisation divide profiles between the EU and the US. In 
services, however, the EU seems to have more firms left behind by digitalisation. At the same 
time, the EU has somewhat more ‘frontrunners’ in services compared to the US. There is 
therefore some evidence of a greater digitalisation divide among services companies in the 
EU than the US, but these differences are not significant8. 
Figure 5: Digitalisation divide in the EU and US, by sector (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
8 Multivariate analysis confirms that there are no statistically significant differences between EU and US firms in 
terms of the likelihood that they are persistently non-active or moving ahead, when comparing within sectors and 
controlling for firm size and age. The greater probability of EU firms being ‘frontrunners’ in services, compared to 
US firms, is only marginally significant (see Rückert et al, 2019).
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Figure 6: Digitalisation divide, by sector and age-size categories (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. Note: Young = less than 10 years old; small = fewer than 50 employees. 
4 Performance and digital polarisation
Why is it important to identify on which side of the digitalisation divide firms are? Does it 
matter for firm performance, or broader economic performance, whether firms are falling 
behind or moving ahead? To address these questions, we looked at how firms with different 
positions relative to the digitalisation divide perform in relation to employment growth, inno-
vation and mark-ups. This analysis is purely correlational and cannot be interpreted as causal. 
4.1 Employment growth
The EIB in 2018 asked firms about their current number of employees and the number of em-
ployees three years ago (see section 2 for information about the EIB survey). Figure 7 shows 
that firms with no plans to start or increase digital investments are also less likely to have 
expanded employment in the past three years. Firms that are ‘persistently non-digital’ score 
particularly poorly on adding jobs over the past three years, especially in the EU9. In contrast, 
companies that plan to increase their digital investments, whether ‘beginners’ or ‘movers 
ahead’ (ie ‘catching-up’ and ‘frontrunners’), are more likely to have increased employment. 
Firms’ positioning on the digitalisation divide thus matters for employment growth: those 
moving ahead are more likely to increase employment, while those left behind are less likely 
to grow. Job destruction effects from digitalisation thus seem more likely to be found in firms 
falling behind, rather than in firms that are forging ahead.
4.2 R&D and innovation 
The EIB data also allows us to draw out innovation profiles. In line with Veugelers et al (2019), 
we identified companies as ‘non innovation-active’ if they do not invest in R&D and do not 
invest in order to develop or introduce new products, processes and services. These firms are 
not engaged in incremental or radical innovation and are not adopting innovation developed 
elsewhere. We would expect digital technologies to empower innovation and therefore firms 
that are moving ahead with digitalisation to be also innovation-active. Figure 8 confirms that 
those firms left behind on the wrong side of the digital divide are also more likely to be ‘non 
9 The results are qualitatively similar when we split the sample by sector and conduct the analysis separately for 
firms in manufacturing or services.
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innovation-active’. Firms moving ahead are significantly more likely than companies in other 
digitalisation categories to be leading innovators10.
Figure 7: Share of firms with positive employment growth in past three years (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
Figure 8: Share of ‘non innovation-active’ firms (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. Note: Firms are considered non innovation-active if they do not invest in R&D and do not invest in order 
to develop or introduce new products, processes and services (Veugelers et al, 2019).
4.3 Mark-ups 
Digitalisation is often linked to increasing market concentration among a few big companies 
with market power. We estimated mark-ups for the firms in our sample and correlated them 
with the digitalisation profiles11. In line with the literature, we are interested in testing wheth-
er firms left behind on the wrong side of the digitalisation divide (ie ‘persistently non-digital’ 
firms) have lower mark-ups and whether firms that are moving ahead have higher mark-ups.
Figure 9 shows that persistently non-digital firms are also significantly less likely to be 
the firms with the top mark-ups in their sectors. Beginners and, even more so, frontrunners 
are likely to be in the top quintile of the distribution of mark-ups in their sector. This is most 
evident for US firms.
10 For a more detailed discussion on multivariate analysis results on the link between the digital divide and 
innovation, see Rückert et al (2019).
11 The estimation of mark-ups is based on the approach of De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).
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Figure 9: Share of firms in the top quintile of the distribution of mark-ups (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
5 Barriers to, and incentives for, investment 
in digitalisation
Finally, we looked at the different barriers and incentives firms perceive when contemplating 
investment in digitalisation. We did this for each of the digitalisation divide categories. Iden-
tifying any barrier that specifically impedes firms that are left behind on the wrong side of the 
digital divide is relevant for the identification of policy levers to help move these firms away 
from of their ‘persistently non-digital’ status. 
5.1 Perceived barriers to investment in digitalisation
Figure 10 shows that the ‘availability of staff with the right skills’ is the most important barrier 
to investment activities: 44 percent of all firms report this as a major obstacle to investment. 
This finding supports the central role of skill formation in any digital policy mix. ‘Uncertainty 
about the future’ and ‘business regulations (eg licences, permits, bankruptcy) and taxation’ 
complete the top three major barriers. Perhaps surprisingly, ‘access to digital infrastructure’ 
is the barrier identified least frequently as a major obstacle. Policies to ensure access to digital 
infrastructure seem to be therefore not (or no longer) necessarily as relevant as previously. 
Figure 10: Share of firms that reported an obstacle to investment as ‘major’ (2018)
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 ‘Persistently non-digital’ firms do not report that the barriers to investment affect them 
more severely than other firms. This evidence would suggest that the lack of digital invest-
ment is not so much a consequence of greater impediments, but of fewer incentives or less 
ambition. Lack of availability of external finance is the only barrier that is more often rated by 
persistently non-digital firms as a major impediment to investment: one out of four persis-
tently non-digital firms rates this as a major barrier compared to one out of six for all firms. 
Figure 11 shows that the availability of external finance seems to be a more severe barrier 
for EU firms than US firms. Unlike in the US, persistently non-digital firms in the EU are sig-
nificantly more likely than other EU firms to report access to finance as a major impediment. 
This suggests that addressing the access to finance issue should be a primary focus for EU 
policymakers to lift their persistently non-digital firms into digitalisation. 
Figure 11: Share of firms that report the availability of external finance as a major 
obstacle to investment (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
5.2 Increased competition because of digitalisation
The 2018 EIB survey also asked about firms’ expectations of future competitive pressure aris-
ing from digitalisation: whether they expect that digital technologies will lead to an increase 
in the number of firms competing in their sector or not. As escaping competition might be a 
major incentive for firms to engage in digital investment, we explored for which firms compe-
tition can work as incentive.
Figure 12: Shares of firms that expect digital technologies to lead to an increase in 
the number of firms competing in their sector (2018)
Source: Bruegel based on EIB data. 
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Overall, 40 percent of surveyed firms expected an increase in competition in their sector 
as a result of digitalisation. In general, US firms are more likely than EU firms to expect an 
increase in competitive pressure, reflecting a more competitive US single market (Figure 12). 
Persistently non-digital firms seem to feel more shielded from competitive pressure, as they 
are less likely to expect an increase in competition arising from digitalisation. This perceived 
lack of competitive pressure contributes to a lack of incentives for persistently non-digital 
firms to engage in digitalisation. Competitive pressure seems to motivate in particular firms in 
the moving ahead category, especially in the US, to further advance in terms of digitalisation. 
6 Conclusions and implications for policy
Our analysis confirms the trend towards a digitalisation divide between companies. A sub-
stantial share of firms does not implement any state-of-the-art digital technology and has no 
plans to start investing in digitalisation. However, a substantial share of firms already partially 
or even fully implements state-of-the-art digital technologies in their businesses, and has 
plans to further increase their digitalisation investments.
In terms of the types of firms that are more likely to be persistently non-digital, firm size 
and firm age matter. Small manufacturing firms and old small services firms are significantly 
more likely to be persistently non-digital. Economies with more old SMEs are therefore more 
vulnerable to corporate digital polarisation. 
Taking into account sector and firm-size differences, our results do not provide any evi-
dence that EU firms are more likely to be stuck on the wrong side of the digitalisation divide 
compared to their US counterparts. There are no significant differences between the EU and 
the US in terms of having more or fewer persistently non-digital firms. Our results show that 
it matters for firms’ performance if they are falling behind and for economies if they have too 
many firms left behind on the wrong side of the digital divide. Persistently non-digital firms 
are less likely to be innovative, less likely to create new jobs and less likely to command higher 
mark-ups, while digitalisation frontrunners are more likely to be innovative and increase their 
workforces, and can command significantly higher mark-ups. Lifting firms out of persistent 
digital non-activity should therefore be high on the policy agenda. 
The EIB survey carried out in 2018 also looked at the barriers firms perceive when con-
templating investment (see EIB, 2018, chapter 8, for details). Overall, our analysis shows 
that policymaking in the EU should be concerned about the lack, and particularly about the 
long-standing lack, of digital investment by some of its firms. SMEs in manufacturing and 
old SMEs in services are likely to be in the danger zone of permanent digital inactivity and 
deserve special policy attention. Addressing barriers to skills should be a priority for poli-
cymakers in order to support firms to digitalise further, irrespective of where they stand in 
relation to the digital divide. Similarly, addressing the regulatory burden and the uncertain-
ties regulation can create should also be high on the digital policy agenda.
The higher sensitivity of US firms and frontrunners to competition when investing in 
digitalisation is a reminder for EU policymakers of the importance of a well-functioning EU 
integrated market. This underpins the call for an industrial policy at EU level which should 
have the single market and competition policy as its core horizontal instruments, to ensure a 
large, competitive market environment that will push firms to invest in digitalisation (as advo-
cated by Altomonte and Veugelers, 2019). Beyond completing the digital single market, the 
single market for non-digital products should be completed, particularly non-digital services 
(as diverse as retail, transport, hotels and banks). On skills, there is a role for the EU to make 
it easier for firms to access digital skills across national borders. This requires, among other 
things, more work on mutual recognition of diplomas and the introduction of a European 
professional card to reduce intra-EU mobility costs. A recalibration of the European Social 
Fund, providing greater support to specific national digital education initiatives and to the 
13 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚17 | December 2019
training and retraining of workers, would also help to address this first-order impediment to 
digital investment. 
The evidence reported here finds access to finance to be a more severe obstacle to invest-
ment for EU firms compared to their US counterparts, particularly for the EU’s persistently 
non-digital firms. Addressing problems of access to finance may therefore go a long way to 
address the EU’s corporate digitalisation divide. 
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